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THE REVIVAL OF A WILL
Charles W. Griffin
Only through a revival can a will that has been revoked
reacquire testamentary effect. This may require a new testa-
mentary act on the part of the testator in re-executing or
republishing the will, at least where the will has been re-
voked by a will containing a clause expressly revoking former
wills. In some jurisdictions it is substantially provided by
statute that a will cannot be revived except by a re-execu-
tion or republication. Nothing less than a re-execution or
republication will suffice to revive a will which has been re-
voked by operation of law. In some jurisdictions a will may
be revived by the revocation of the later will effected by its
destruction by the testator.
If a testator tears his will into pieces with the intent
to revoke the will, he cannot revive the will later by putting
the pieces together and taping them. He must re-execute his
will or republish it in order to work a revival. The revoca-
tion is complete and is not effected by the subsequent acts
of the testator. A testator may revoke his will by cutting
out his signature thereto, but he cannot restore the instru-
ment to its effectiveness by pasting the signature in its
previous position. 1
A will that has been revoked by marriage is revoked by
operation of law. The testator has no control of this revoca-
tion. A mere subsequent recognition will not revive it. The
same is true where a will has been revoked by the birth of a
child. A will revoked by the marriage of the testatrix is
not revived by the death of her husband. A will by the testa-
tor favoring his wife, which is presumptively revoked by a
divorce between the parties, and settlement of their property
rights cannot be revived except by acts sufficient to make a
valid will. 2
A will giving a daughter a specified sum of money, and a
codicil giving her specified stocks owned by the testator, in
lieu of the money, if the stocks are not found among the
testator's assets, the daughter takes neither the money nor
the stocks.3 In a few cases it has been held that the
failure of a bequest made by a codicil in substitution of a
bequest made by the will to the same person has the effect of
revising the original bequest, especially where the codicil
or later will did not contain a clause expressly revoking the
original bequest.
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Revocation of Later Will or Codicil as
Revival of Earlier Will
A will which has been revoked by a second will may be re-
vived by a later will which revokes the second will, provided
the intention to revive it clearly appears in the terms of the
later will. Some cases hold that the revocation of a subse-
quent will, effected by the destruction of the instrument,
does not revive a prior will, at least where the subsequent
will contains an express revocation clause. In the states
following such a view, the courts disregard the orally ex-
pressed desire of the testator that his prior will should
stand on his revocation of his later will. The theory is that
the revocation of a will by a later will is effective im-
mediately upon the execution of the later will and that once
a will has been revoked, it cannot be considered as having
either a present or potential existence as a will, even though
the instrument has been preserved.5
Many authorities adhere to the view that the question
whether the revocation of a later will by the destruction of
the instrument revives an earlier will which has been pre-
served depends, in the last analysis, upon the intention of
the testator. Various views are expressed as to the effect of
the failure to prove his intention. There are some cases that
hold the revocation, effected by the destruction of the in-
strument, of a will which revoked a prior will operates to re-
vive the prior will, unless it is clearly proved that the
testator revoked the later will with the intention of dying
intestate, or that he revoked it with the purpose of substi-
tuting for it a third will, which was never accomplished.
Some authorities state that it is presumed from the acts of a
testator in destroying the latter will and preserving uncan-
celed the prior will that he intended to revive and restore
the prior will. It has been held, however, that such pre-
sumption is of slight weight.6 It is clearly not a conclu-
sive presumption. If it is established by the proof that the
testator intended to die intestate, the former will cannot be
admitted to probate. The presumption of revival, it is said,
is rebutted by evidence of the testator's intention not to
revive. The intention of the testator should control irre-
spective of whether the later will revoked the former ex-
pressly by a revoca ion of provisions inconsistent with these
of the former will. The question of the intention of the
testator is a question of fact to be decided by the jury. It
is not a question of law.
3
The courts are not agreed whether the provisions of a
will which are modified or revoked by a codicil are restored
to their original form and effect by the destruction of the
codicil with intent to revoke it. Some authorities say that
a will is restored to the form in which it stood before a
codicil was executed, where the codicil is revoked by destruc-
tion of the instrument. Other authorities say the will is not
restored to its original status by the revocation of a codicil
thereto, effected by the destruction of the instrument, at
least, not in the absence of competent evidence that it was
the intention of the testator to revive the provisions of the
will by the revocation of the codicil. The view of these
authorities is that after a revocation has been consummated by
the execution of a codicil, the will could not be restored to
its original form and tenor simply by the revocation of the
codicil. It has been held that where several items of a will
have been specifically revoked by a codicil and the codicil
afterward destroyed at the testator's direction, the items of
the will so revoked cannot be revived by paid declarations of
the testator to others, than the original attesting witness to
the will, who do not subscribe as witnesses to the will. 8
Republication and Re-execution
The re-execution or republication of a will has been held
essential in various situations to validate alterations in the
will and to revive a revoked will. The terms "re-execution"
and "republication" are synonymous in the sense in which they
are often used. They are clearly distinct, however, in the
respect that a will may be republished by re-execution of the
original will or by executing a codicil to the will. A duly
executed codicil operates as a republication of the original
will and makes it speak from the new date, insofar as it is
not deterred or revoked by the codicil. The codicil does not
have to be physically annexed to the will and the will does
not have to be in the presence of the testator at the time of
executing the codicil, where it refers to the will in such a
way as to identify that instrument beyond doubt. If a codicil
revokes in terms portions of the will, it republishes the will
as of the date of the codicil in respect of all parts not re-
voked.9
There are many ways that a will or codicil to a will can
be revived. In the previous pages I have attempted to set out
a few of the ways in which this can be accomplished. There
4
are many more that have been omitted. By far the safest and
best ways to revive a will or codicil are to re-execute or re-
publish the will or codicil. The two methods of revival of a
will are sure methods and will eliminate much unnecessary
litigation by heirs and legatees. To revive a will or codi-
cil, re-execute or republish the prior will or codicil and be
sure that the revival is complete.
FOOTNOTES
1. Henry v. Fraser, 62 A.L.R. 1386 - case in which an instru-
ment was held entitled to probate, where the testator's
signature had been erased and Testored by him, appear to
have been decided upon the theory that the will was re-
vived, but that it had not been revoked.
2. In re McGraw, 42 A.L.R. 1283 (1926).
3. Owen v. Busiel, 83 N.H. 345, 59 A.L.R. 1103 (1928).
4. 59 A.L.R. 1109, 1110, note 3, supra.
5. Hawes v. Nicholas, 71 Tex. 481, 10 S.W. 559.
6. Whitehill v. Halbing, 28 A.L.R. 916, 917.
7. In re Burtt, 162 A.L.R. 1053.
8. Collins v. Collins, 110 Ohio St. 105, 38 A.L.R. 230.























FOREIGN DIVORCE REVOLUTION IN NEW YORK
(Case note: Rosenstiel v. Rosenstiel)
Augustus H. Davis
For 160 years, the State of New York has recognized
adultery as the only cause of divorce. Domestic Relation Law,
Section 170. Many people have criticized the New York law as
being outmoded, heartless, cruel or even archaic. But New
York defends public policy of the State as to divorce "exists
to promote the permanency of the marriage contracts and the
morality of the citizens of the State." Hubbard v. Hubbard,
228 N.Y. 81, 126 N.E. 508 (1920). There was once a refusal in
the State to approve the practice of its residents going to
other jurisdictions to evade the New York law and get divorces
upon grounds forbidden in New York.
It is well established that if residents of one state so
desire, they may go to another state and qet a divorce and the
Full Faith and Credit Doctrine will apply. Williams v. North
Carolina, 325 U.S. 226 (1945). On the other hand, if the
residents go to another country, the laws of the state will
determine if the foreign decree is to be recognized. Where
the grounds in the foreign forum do not undermine the laws of
the state and the other requirements such as residence and
jurisdiction have been adhered to, should not the divorce be
deemed valid? But the problem arises where the foreign court
grants divorces without strictly applying the rules of juris-
diction and where residency can be arrived at by minimal con-
tact.
On July 9, 1965, the Court of Appeals set a precedent in
Rosenstiel v, Rosenstiel, 16 N.Y. 2d 64, 262 N.Y.S. 2d 86.
The court decided that recognition is to be given to foreign
divorces based on grounds not accepted in New York where per-
sonal jurisdiction of one party to the marriage has been
acquired by minimal contact and jurisdiction of the other
party was obtained by the other party answering through an
attorney. This was a milestone as far as divorce proceedings
were concerned in New York. Now residents of New York can go
to a foreign country and not have the divorce declared invalid
as was the case in Caldwell v. Caldwell, 298 N.Y. 146, 81 N.E.
2d 60 (1948). This case did not stand on all fours with
Rosenstiel v. Rosenstiel, supra, because neither party in the
Caldwell case went to Mexico. They merely secured resident
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counsels in Mexico who proceeded for them and obtained the
divorce.
Martens v, Martens, 284 N.Y. 363, 31 N.E. 2d 489 (1940)
has long been the existing New York law. In this case at page
490 the court said:
Judgments of courts of foreign countries are re-
ceived in evidence in our courts when duly
authenticated, but they differ from judgments of
courts of our sister states to which, by consti-
tutional mandate, full faith and credit must be
given. They must not contravene our public policy.
In order to pass upon the question as to whether
a judgment of a court of a foreign country is to be
recognized, there must be a disclosure of the juris-
diction of the foreign court of the subject matter
and of the parties.
Rosenstiel v. Rosenstiel, supra, was an action in which Lewis
Rosenstiel contended that his 1956 marriage to Susan
Rosenstiel was invalid and he should be granted an annulment
on the grounds that Susan Rosenstiel's Mexican divorce was in-
valid. In 1954, Felix Kaufman went to Juarez, Mexico, regis-
tered as a resident and filed an action for divorce based on
incompatability and ill-treatment between the spouses. In
all, he spent about one hour in Mexico and the divorce was
granted. The wife submitted to the jurisdiction by appearing
through an attorney and filed an answer in which she admitted
the allegations of her husband's complaint. Mr. Rosenstiel
was upheld by the New York Supreme Court but the appellate
division reversed. The reversal by the appellate division was
upheld by the Court of Appeals. In the majority opinion
written by Judge Bergan, he declared that there was no dif-
ference in substance between a one-day divorce granted in
Mexico and a six weeks' divorce granted in Nevada and that the
public interest of New York was not differently affected; that
in these modern days and times the marriage was an entity and
traveled with the parties. In a sharp dissent, Judge Scileppi
held that the Mexican divorce in the Rosenstiel case should be
invalidated and so should every other one of the type coming
up in the future.
It seems that the anxiety of couples in their attempts
to obtain foreign divorces has caused the New York Courts to
7
broaden the divorce laws, and that the trend is leaning
heavily toward the day when mail-order divorces will be valid.
8
SHOULD CHARITABLE INSTITUTIONS BE IMMUNE FROM LIABILITY?
Zollie Richburg
Tort law is never stationary. Courts are constantly
making changes and this fact must always be borne in mind.
What was once the rule has now become the exception. Because
of the fluidity of subject-matter, some cases cited in this
article may be overruled before it is off the press. It is
necessary to note that some of the concepts expressed herein
are my personal concepts.
As every law student knows, American courts from time to
time have adopted and adhered to decisions handed down by
English courts. Although English courts have repudiated some
of these decisions, some American courts, nevertheless, still
adhere to them as being sound law. 1 In the year 1876, a land-
mark decision was handed down by the Supreme Court of Massa-
chusetts.la This case is often cited to support one principle
of law--that is, one cannot sue a charitable corporation for
the negligent act of its servant or agent. In making this
determination, the court relied on an English case,2 which
held that persons entrusted with the performance of a public
duty cannot be held liable for an injury sustained by an in-
dividual through the negligence of workmen employed under
them.
In 1885, Maryland3 was faced with a similar problem. The
Maryland court cited another English case4 which held that "if
charity trustees are guilty of a breach of trust, the person
thereby injured has no right to be indemnified by damages out
of the trust fund." 5  The Maryland case held that an action
does not lie against a state House of Refuge for an assault on
an inmate by an officer thereof.
The Maryland and Massachusetts decisions, cited supra,
are unique in that the case Massachusetts relied on was over-
ruled ten years previously and the case Maryland relied on was
overruled nineteen years prior to that state court's deci-
sion.6
Many grounds have been stated in an attempt to justify
the doctrine of charitable immunity.7 Some courts which
adhere to the immunity rule base their decisions on the
ground that charity exists for the benefit of the public.8
9
Another theory which is frequently used is that of public
policy.9 This theory is predicated upon the conception that
donors will be discouraged for fear their gifts or donations
will go to pay tort claims.10
Many courts, however, hold that the doctrine of chari-
table immunity is a theory unsupported by statutory law and
should not be supported by case and judicial law.1 The
immunity rule has been repudiated in many states and is now a
minority rule in America.12 There are some states which im-
pose liability by statutes.13 Three states have restricted
the immunity rule to those who receive the benefits free. 14
It is difficult to place a state in a certain class and sa
whether it adheres to the immunity rule. Professor Prosser
listed twenty jurisdictions which have repudiated the immunity
rule. In addition to the jurisdictions listed by Professor
Prosser, Ohio has repudiated t except perhags for churches. 16
The States of West Virginia, Miissssippi, 1 Alabamal8a
Illinois 18b New Jersey, 19 Washington,19 a Idahol 9b and Penn-
sylvania O may be added to this list as repudiating the im-
munity doctrine completely.
Whether and to what extent a person injured by a servant
or employee of a charity can sue a charity in jurisdictions
not abolishing the immunity rule is a difficult question.
Some courts seem to be walking a tightrope, never exactly
overruling the immunity rule but always making exceptions to
it. One exception is that if the charitable institution
carries insurance, then an injured party may sue and recover
to the extent of the insurance.2 1 Another exception is that
if the charitable institution exercises due care in its se-
lection of employees, it cannot be held liable for injuries
resulting from the negligence of the employees.2 2 Where im-
munity is not absolute, it is usually called the "qualified
immunity rule." 2 3 The Restatement, Torts, takes the position
that "no one, except the State, has complete immunity from
liability in torts." 2 4
The2 mmunity rule has been severely criticized by learned
writers. These writers favor an outright repudiation of the
immunity rule. One theory has been advanced for circumventing
the rule. If the immunity is in force in a jurisdiction, why
not let the injured party waive the tort and sue in con-
tract?2 6 To better understand the criticism, one must under-
stand why charities were immune in the first place.
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In the early days of society, hospitals bore the true
character of charitable institutions. They were a haven for
the indigent ill, lame, and disabled. The expense of their
operation and maintenance was, for the most part, borne by
contributions from charitable inclined citizens. The indigent
rarely paid for services rendered to them. Charity in its
true sense prevailed. Charitable institutions had little, if
any funds, and a suit by an injured party would work a deple-
tion on the charitable funds.
Today charity is big business.26a Tax deductions some-
times make it actually profitable for donors to give to
charity.2 6b Charity today is a large-scale operation with
salaries, costs, and other expenses similar to business
generally. "The old rule of charitable immunity was justi-
fied in its time, on its own facts. Today we have a new set
of facts. It is true that the new facts are still described
by the same word in our language--charities--but that is be-
cause our language has not changed as the facts of our life
have changed." 2 7
The immunity rule is a doctrine built entirely on sand,
as ev enced by the decisions of Massachusetts 2 8 and Mary-
land. Some courts even insist that if the immunity rule is
to undergo mutation, the only surgeon capable of performing
the operation is the Legislature.30 The rule is not the
creation of the Legislature, and what the court put together
it certainly should be able to dismantle. If a court can
close its doors without legislative help, there is no justi-
fiable reason why it cannot likewise open them.3 0a
As has been stated,31 a charity may protest to high
heaven its unwillingness to be sued and the protest avails it
not. In other states charities are protected by an invisible
wall immunity.3 2
"The immunity doctrine began in error, lifted its head
in fallacy, and climbed to its shaky height only because few
dared to question whether charity was really charity." 3 3 The
question never arose whether the rule was grounded in good
moral and sound law. Courts were content to refer to the
previous decisions. It is inconceivable, to say the least,
that the courts, in weighing the property interest of a
charity against the interest of a victim of its tortious act,
value the property interest of the charity more highly than
11
that of the innocent victim.
In conclusion, it seems that the immunity rule assaults
equality of the law and the maxim "where there is a wrong
there is a remedy to redress it." The modern trend and weight
of authority is that the immunity rule is definitely out.
"Charity suffereth long and is kind, but in the common law it
cannot be careless. When it is, it ceases to be kindness and
becomes actionable wrong-doing." 3 4
FOOTNOTES
1. See e.g., Foreman v. Cantebury Court of Queen's Bench Law
Rep. 1870-71, 214, and then see notes 2, 3, and 4.
la. McDonald v. Mass. General Hospital, 120 Mass. 432, 21 Am.
Rep. 529 (1876).
2. Holliday v. St. Leonard, 142 E.R. 769 (1861).
3. Perry v. House of Refuge, 63 Md. 20, 52 Am. Rep. 495
(1885).
4. Heroit's Hospital v. Ross, 8 E.R. 1508 (1861).
5. See note 4, supra (headnote).
6. Mersey Dock Trustee v. Gibbs, 11 E.R. 1500 (1866). It is
curious to note that none of these cases really involved
charity in its true sense. The Heroit's Hospital case,
supra, involved a claim for damages on the part of an
applicant for rejection from the benefit of the charity.
The Holliday case, supra, was the performance of a public
duty. The defendant was relieved of liability because of
the General Highway Act, 5 and 6 W.4, c. 50. The American
cases stressed certain dicta which were uttered by English
judges.
7. For an excellent discussion on this point, see Harper and
James, The Law of Torts, pp. 1667-1671, Sec. 29.16
(1956). Not many grounds nor lengthy criticism of this
doctrine will be attempted. Those who like the doctrine
are entitled to their preferences. The writer prefers to
agree with the opinion of Justice Musmanno in the
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Flagiello case, i a, note 20, and the Restatement, in-
fra, note 24. Charities should not be allowed to per-
petrate injustice to some in order to bestow charity on
others. If public policy demands such a rule, the legis-
lature, not the courts, should make the first move.
8. Taylor v. Protestant Hosp. Ass'n, 85 Ohio St. 90, 96 N.E.
1089 (1911). The only question presented was whether
defendant would be liable for the negligence of its nurse
in leaving a sponge in the body of deceased. The court
held "no," and gave the usual reason.
9. Vermillion v. Woman's College of Due West, 104 S.E. 649
(1916). "If public policy ever required that charitable
institutions should be immune from liability for the
torts of their servants, that public policy no longer
exists . . . to exempt charitable and non-profit corpo-
rations from liability for their torts is plainly con-
trary to our constitutional quaranties," infra, note 15,
Noel v. Menniger Foundation, 267 P. 2d 934 1954).
10. See 23 A.L.R. 907 (1921). This reasoning is difficult to
see with insurance so easily obtainable.
11. Gamble v. Vanderbilt University, 138 Tenn. 616, 200 S.W.
510 (1918). This case did not exactly overrule the
immunity rule, but it cut so deeply into the flesh of
charitable immunity, its survival is doubtful. See
Spivey v. St. Thomas Hosp., 31 Tenn. App. 12, 211 S.W. 2d
450, which intimated that the only immunity now granted
to charity is the depletion of its trust fund. For a
thorough investination of the immunity rule, see Miss.
Baptist Hosp. v. Holmes, 214 Miss. 906, 55 So. 2d 142
(1951). This case represents the modern trend.
12. Roanoke Hosp. Ass'n v. Hayes, 1 A.L.R. 3d 1026 (1965).
See Prosser, Torts, 3d ed., p. 1024, Sec. 127 (1964).
See notes 17-20, infra.
13. Michael v. St. Paul Mercury Indemnity Co., 92 F. Supp.
141 (W. D. Ark. 1950). See note 19, infra. See also
Ark. Stats. Secs. 64-1525 and 66-517.
14, Morton v. Savannah, 148 Ga. 438, 96 S.E. 887 (1918);
Baptist Memorial Hosp. v. Marrable, 244 S.W. 2d 567
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(1951); and Indiana, Ball Memorial Hosp. v. Freeman, 196
N.E. 2d 274 (1964). Should "a patient entirely unskilled
in legal principles, his body racked with pain, his mind
distorted with fever, be held to know, by intuition, the
principle of law that" he can recover for the negligence
of the charitable corporation's servant only if he is a
paying patient? See dissent by Justice Fraser, Lindler
v. Columbia Hosp., 98 S.C. 25, 81 S.E. 512. For a
thorough investigation of all cases prior to 1951 deal-
ing with the immunity doctrine, see 25 A.L.R. 2d 1-200
(1950). A.L.R. listed five states that support the view
that paying patients can recover. See A.L.R. 2d Supple-
ment Service (1960 issue), p. 2080, sec. 25. This is an
error. One of the cases cited was Williams v. Hospital,
237 N.C. 387 (1953), note 22 infra. The holding in the
Williams case reads: "We are impelled to the conclusion
that no exception should be made in our rule of immunity
in favor of paying patrons of charitable institutions."
15. See note 12, supra. These jurisdictions are: Alaska,
Tuengel v. City of Sitka, 14 Alaska 546, 118 F. Supp.
399 (1954); Arizona, Roy v. Tucson Medical Center, 72
Ariz. 22, 230 P. 2d 220 (1951); California, Malloy v.
Fong, 37 Cal. 2d 356, 232 P. 2d 241 (1951); Delaware,
Durney v. St. Francis Hosp., 7 Terry, Del. 350, 83 A. 2d
753 (1951); Florida, Sawannee County Hosp., Corp. v.
Golden, Fla. 1952, 56 So. 2d 911; Iowa, Haynes v. Pres-
byterian Hosp. Ass'n, 241 Iowa 1269, 45 N.W. 2d 151
(1950); Kansas, Noel v. Menninger Foundation, 175 Kan.
751, 267 P. 2d 934 (1954); Kentucky, Sheppard v.
Immanuel Baptist Church, 353 S.W. 2d 212 (1961); Michi-
gan, Parker v. Port Huron Hosp., 361 Mich. 1, 105 N.W.
2d 1 (1960); Minnesota, Maeller v. Hauser, 237 Minn.
368, 54 N.W. 2d 636 (1952); Montana, Howard v. Sister of
Charity of Leavenworth, 193 F. Supp. 191 (1961); North
Dakota, Rickbeil v. Grafton Deaconess Hosp., 74 N.D. 525,
23 N.W. 2d 23 (1961). New York, Bing v. Thunig, 2 N.Y.
2d 656, 143 N.E. 2d 3 (1957); Oklahoma, Gable v. Salva-
tion Army, 186 Okla. 687, 100 P. 2d 244 (1940); Oregon,
Hungerford v. Portland Sanitarium and Bener. Ass'n, Or.
1963, 384 P. 2d 1009; Puerto Rico, Taverez v. San Juan
Lodge No. 972, B.P.O.E., 1948, 68 Puerto Rico 681; Utah,
Sessions v. Thomas D. Dee Memorial Hosp. Ass'n, 94 Utah
460, 78 P. 2d 645 (1938); Vermont, Foster v. Roman
Catholic Diosese of Vermont, 166 Vt. 124, 70 A. 2d 230
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(1950); District of Columbia, President and Directors of
Georgetown College v. Hugher, 1942, 76 U.S. App. P. C.
133, 130 F. 2d 810; and Wheeler v. Manadnock Community
Hosp., 103 N.H. 366, 171 A. 2d 23 (1961). As to Virginia
the writer has doubt if the immunity rule is in force
there. Virginia seems to be in zone of partial immunity
and repudiation. See Roanoke Hosp. Ass'n v. Hayes, 204
Va. 703, 133 S.E. 2d 559 (1963). If the person injured
is an invitee, then he can recover.
16. Gibbon v. Y.W.C.A., 170 Ohio St. 280, 164 N.E. 2d 563
(1960).
17. Adkins v. St. Francis Hosp. of Charleston, 143 S.E. 2d
154 (1965).
18. See note 11, supra. The writer doubts if there is any
immunity left.
18a. Tucker v. Mobile Infirmary Ass'n, 191 Ala. 572, 68 So. 4
(1915). This case gives an excellent discussion of the
McDonald case, supra; Professor Prosser listed Alabama
as one state which restricts the immunity rule to those
who receive the benefits free, supra, note 12. As far as
the writer can discern, Alabama has rejected the doctrine
outright. See Laney v. Jefferson County, 32 So. 2d 542,
544 (1947). In the Tucker case, the court pretermitted
the question as to liability for injury to a non-paying
patient. But it was intimated that the charitable cor-
poration would be liable. The Laney case expressly
states that there is no immunity. The court in the Laney
case was not called upon to answer that question. Since
the author is basing this article on quality of reason-
ing as well as numerical volume, Alabama has to be
placed as one of the states overruling the immunity
doctrine. Even some courts which cite the Tucker case
are confused to its holding. See e.g., Williams v.
Hospital, 237 N.C. 387 (1953); and Muller v. Nebraska
Methodist Hospital, 160 Neb. 279, 70 N.W. 2d 86 (1955).
18b. Darling v. Charleston Community Memorial Hosp., 211 N.E.
2d 253 (1965). 211 N.E. 2d at page 260 reads: "We agree
that the doctrine of charitable immunity can no longer
stand . . . a doctrine which limits the liability of
charitable corporation to the amount of liability
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insurance that they see fit to carry permits them to
determine whether or not they will be liable for their
torts and the amount of that liability, if any."
Illinois was one of the jurisdictions which held that an
injured person could sue the charity and recover to the
extent of the insurance carried by the charity. See
e.g., Johnston v. Girwin, 208 N.E. 2d 894 (1965).
19. Anasiewicz v. Sacred Heart Church, 74 N.J. Super. 532,
181 A. 2d 787 (1962). The court repudiated the immunity
rule but it was reenacted by statute, N. J. S. 2A: 53A-7,
10, N.J.S.A.; this statute was passed for the purpose of
giving the charities time to take out insurance.
19a. Friend v. Cove Methodist Church, Inc., 396 P. 2d 546
(1965).
19b. Wheat v. Idaho Falls Latter Day Saints Hosp., 78 Idaho
60, 297 P. 2d 1041 (1956).
20. Flagiello v. Pennsylvania Hosp., 417 Pa. 486, 208 A. 2d
193 (1965). This opinion by Musmanno, Justice, is un-
doubtably the best opinion handed down in many years.
21. See Sixth Decennial Digest and General Digest, Third
Series, of West Publishing Company, Charities, Key
Number 45 (2).
22. Berry v. Odom, 222 F.S. 467 (M.D.N.C. 1963). It is not
the author's intention to list all exceptions to all
states, but the exceptions that are common to most
states. To list the various exceptions from each state
would be too numerous. Take e.g., North Carolina. A
servant can recover for administrative negligence of the
charity. Cowans v. Hospital, 197 N.C. 41, 147 S.E. 672
(1929). "Thus the rule to which we adhere is that of
qualified immunity." Williams v. Hospital, 237 N. C.
387 (1953). "The majority of the courts allow strangers
to the charity such as visitors, bystanders, invitees,
and employees to recover against it, but refuse to allow
beneficiaries of the charity to recover." Note 30 N.C.
Law Rev. 67, (1952). Herndon v. Massey, 217 N.C. 610,
85 S.E. 2d 914 (1940).
23. See note 12, supra.
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24. Restatement, Torts, sec. 886 (1939); Restatement (2d),
Trusts, sec. 402, Subsec. (2) reads: "A person against
whom a tort is committed in the course of administration
of a charitable trust can reach trust property and apply
it to the satisfaction of his claim."
25. Appleman, The Tort Liability of Charitable Institutions,
22 A.B.A.J. 48 (1936); Feezer, The Tort Liability of
Charities, 77 U. Pa. L. Rev. 191 (1928); and Zollman,
Damage Liability of Charitable Institutions, 19 Mich. L.
Rev. 395 (1921).
26. Note 32 N.C.L. Rev. 129 (1953-54). This seems to be a
good theory where immunity is absolute, except the in-
jured party is limited only to what he had paid. If he
is receiving the benefits free, then he recovers nothing.
In a state with a direct action statute, see Oltarsh v.
Aetna Ins. Co., 15 N.Y. 2d 11, 204 N.E. 2d 622 (1965),
the injured party may by-pass the charity and sue the
insurer; and if he is successful, he may recover to the
content of the insurance contract. This may not be just,
considering the fact that the charity may not carry a
sufficient amount of insurance to compensate the injured
party. See note 18a, supra, where recovery was allowed
in contract even though the plaintiff could have sued on
the tort. One thing has puzzled this writer. If a
charity knows that it is immune from liability, why
would it take out insurance? It seems as though the
charity is paying premiums for nothing. Take e.g., the
case of Springer v. Federated Church of Reno, Nevada,
283 P. 2d 1071 (1955), where the court held that exemp-
tion from tort liability may voluntarily be waived by
charitable organizations for the benefit of their
members. There is no logic in the decision. This type
of reasoning can lead to defrauding the insurance com-
pany. If the charity is a hospital and one of its
doctors is injured, then, in order to retain his service
the charity waives its immunity. A charity probably
will not waive its immunity for a patient who is in-
jured, because he is neither doctor nor nurse, and his
service is neither needed nor required.
26a. The term business has no definite or legal meaning and
is not dependent on whether enterprise is profitable or
has prospects of being profitable. One can best
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understand how charity is big business by a comment in
1963 Duke L.J. 506, Charitable Annuities: Cost and
Capital Gain in Light of 1962 Revenue Rulings. "It is
not uncommon practice today for charitable institutions
to issue annuities." An example is cited in footnote
(2). Suppose the donor transfers to a charity property
worth $80,000. In return the charity promises to pay
him $5,000 per year for life. The donor's life expect-
ancy is ten years so that he could have purchased a
$5,000 life annuity from an insurance company for approx-
imately $50,000. He has in effect made a gift of approx-
imately $30,000 to charity." If the donor lives for
twenty years, then the charity will pay $100,000. This
will be a loss of $20,000.
26b. See e.g., Passailaigue v. United States, 224 F. Supp.
682 (1963). Taxpayer granted use to a charitable cor-
poration certain property. Under the Internal Revenue
Code of 1954, Treasury Regulations Sec. 1.170-1 (c) pro-
vides that "if a contribution is made in property, other
than money, the amount of the deduction is determined by
the fair market value of the property at the time of the
contribution . . ." (Emphasis added.) Taxpayer was
able to deduct $2,400 a year. See also Orr v. United
States, 343 F. 2d 553 (1965). Taxpayer sued for refund.
The taxpayer made payment for liability insurance on his
automobile and airplane used by him in part for the
benefit of a church. The court refused to award him a
refund saying that he (taxpayer) was going to take out
liability insurance anyway and that the church was not
the sole beneficiary of the insurance nor airplane and
automobile. See comment cited in Duke L.J., note 26a,
supra.
27. Parker v. Port Huron Hospital, 361 Mich. 1, 105 N.W. 2d
1 (1960). "A pure charity is one which is entirely
gratuitous, and which dispenses its benefits without any
charge or pecuniary return whatever." In Re Lenox's
Estate, 9 N.Y.S. 895 (1890).
28. See note 1, supra. Some courts call the doctrine of
charitable immunity the "trust fund" theory, which
simply means a fund which, legally or equitably, is sub-
ject to be devoted to a particular purpose and cannot or
should not be diverted therefrom. No matter what the
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immunity rule may be called, the injured party still
suffers and the wrong, which some courts made legal,
still remains.
29. See note 3, supra. Both cases represent a good job of
judges and lawyers as not doing their homework. If the
judges and lawyers had done their homework, they would
have realized that English courts had overruled the
cases relied upon not once but twice. A doctrine was
built without having any supporting structure. It was
like building a house without a foundation, soon the
house will crumble. And just like the house, the doc-
trine of charitable immunity will and has crumbled in
most jurisdictions.
30. Lindler v. Columbia Hospital, 98 S.C. 25, 81 S.E. 512
(1914). See note 20, supra, dissent by Jones, Justice.
30a. See note 20, sura.
31. See note 27, supra.
32. See notes 1, 3, and 22, supra. Many jurisdictions have
gotten away from the immunity rule, and there is a trend
among some jurisdictions to take the immunity away
gradually. The erosion is too slow for the already
leisurely stroll justice has taken.
33. See note 20, supra.
34. See note 18a, supra.
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A NOTE ON JUVENILE RECORDS
Norman W. Hendrickson
The fundamental philosophy of juvenile court laws is
that a delinquent child should be considered and treated not
as a criminal, but as a person requiring care, education and
protection. Therefore, the primary function of juvenile
courts is not to convict or punish but to prevent crimes and
rehabilitate juvenile delinquents.
The note on juvenile records speaks to the point of how
these records and proceedings are treated by the court.
Chapter 97 of the North Carolina Laws of 1919 entitled
"An Act to Establish Juvenile Courts," now Article 2, Section
110-21 of the General Statutes, was before the court for con-
struction in State v. Burnett1 where, among other things, it
stated that the court shall maintain a full and complete
record of all cases before it to be known as the Juvenile
Records.
(a) All records may be withheld from indiscriminate
public inspection in the discretion of the
judge of the court but such records shall be
open to inspection by the parents, guardians,
or other authoritative representatives of the
child concerned.
(b) No adjudication under the provision of this
act shall operate as a disqualification of
any child from any public office and no child
shall be denominated a criminal by reason of
such adjudication nor shall such adjudication
be denominated a conviction. This act shall
be construed liberally and as remedial in
character.
Now in Malone v. State,2 an Ohio case, the defendant was
sixteen years of age. It was held therein that it was pre-
judical error to permit cross-examination of a defendant in a
criminal case as to the commission of offenses prior to the
one for which he is being tried, when such inquiry was predi-
cated upon a juvenile court proceeding. The court further
stated: "Misdeeds of children are not looked upon in the
juvenile court as crimes carrying conviction but as
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delinquencies which the state endeavors to rectify by placing
the child under favorable influence and by the employment of
other corrective methods. Motivated by a humanitarian
impulse, the law prohibits the use of juvenile proceedings or
proof developed thereon against a child, in any other court,
to discredit him or to mark him as one possessing a criminal
history."
In State v. Kelly (La.) 3 the court held that a fourteen
year old witness for the state in a homicide prosecution could
be impeached neither by the use of juvenile court records in-
volving the witness nor by questions relative to juvenile pro-
ceedings.
Also in Burge v. State (Texas)4 the court held that a
witness testifying for the state, in an effort to convict the
defendant of soliciting his wife to engage in illicit rela-
tions with other persons, could not be impeached by testimony
to show that the witness had been found guilty in a juvenile
court.
And in State v. Guerro (Ariz.)5 the court held that a
nineteen year old complaining witness in a prosecution for
forcible rape, could not be asked impeaching questions regard-
ing a juvenile record for the purpose6of showing prior un-
chastity. Also in State v. Cox (Mo.) the court held in a
prosecution for having carnal knowledge of a female under
eighteen years of age, the defendant could not be allowed to
cross-examine the prosecutrix regarding alleged conflicting
statements made by her in the juvenile court, to affect her
credibility and to lay grounds for impeachment regardless of
the nature of the delinquent or the hearing thereon in the
juvenile court, under a statute forbidding the use of such
evidence in any other proceeding. Thus, the majority view
appears to be that juvenile records cannot be admitted in
evidence in any other proceeding.
However, in People v. Smallwood (Mich.)7 the court held
it was a reversible error in a trial for statutory rape to
refuse to allow cross-examination of the complaining witness,
a girl of fifteen years of age, who was the daughter of the
accused and who had shown both a lack of morals and a hostile
motive for having made this charge. When the daughter was on
the witness stand, she was asked on cross-examination whether
he had been in trouble with the juvenile authorities before.
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On objection the lower court excluded the question stating
that the "juvenile records are not admissible." The review-
ing court stated: "There is no question but that this salu-
tary statute is for the purpose of protecting a child when it
becomes a ward of the state. Its aim is to hide youthful
errors from the full gaze of the public and bury them in the
graveyard of the forgotten past. It prohibits the use of
juvenile court proceedings or evidence obtained therein
against a child in any other court to discredit him as one
possessing a criminal history."
However, in the present case, there was no effort to
impeach the child's character but rather to ascertain her
credibility. In conclusion, the court said: "We think the
testimony should have been received, not in extenuation of
rape, but for its bearing upon the question of whether the
mind of the girl was so warped by sexual contemplation and
desires as to lead her to accept the imagined as real, or to
fabricate a claimed experience."
Conclusion
We can now reach the following general conclusions:
1. In regard to statutes against the use of juvenile
records or proceedings therein, there seems to be
no disagreement that the prohibition should re-
ceive a literal construction.
2. That proceedings in a juvenile court are not
criminal in character, leaving the actors with
any criminal stigma.
3. The consensus of opinion is that the best
interest of the public, is to reform the juvenile
offender and then protecting him from afterward
being dragged back into the criminal class by
the automatic operation of the law for habitual
offenders.
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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW - GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY
A COMPARATIVE LOOK
LeMarquis DeJarmon
When one, who has received all his training in the common
law, looks at the development of administrative law in the
common-law countries and at its development in the civil-law
countries, he is immediately impressed with the difference in
treatment. In the common-law countries, the starting point has
been the recognition of complete immunity on the part of the
sovereign and yet at the same time not recognizing the right of
the official to share in that immunity. The common-law
countries, by stripping the official acts are called into ques-
tion, have in actuality converted what should be an action
between the government and the governed into an action between
two private persons. 1
On the other hand the droit administratif of France has
never had anything like strict personal liability of public
officers. The French public officials enjoyed complete
immunity along with the French sovereign. This immunity seems
to have been the results of an early French procedure. In the
pre-revolutionary days, under the Ancien Regime whenever an
attempt was made to bring suit against one of the King's offi-
cials, the King would have the action transferred to his own
council for disposition. The end product of this practice was
that, for all intents and purposes, the official 2was immuned
from suit in the ordinary courts of the country.
It is readily apparent that the common-law countries and
the civil-law countries started at opposite poles, i.e., the
former giving the official no immunity, the latter affording
the official complete immunity. This difference in the treat-
ment of the administrative official may be explained in part
by the impact of earlier history. England which had the ex-
perience of the pre-Magna Charta era behind it was naturally
more suspicious of the actions of a despotic executive, and
therefore looked to the judiciary for the protection of indi-
vidual liberties. France, contrariwise, by virtue of its
historical experiences was more suspicious of the judiciary.3
Thus, to the French, separation of powers meant the non-
interference with the administration by the judiciary.4 The
same general attitude prevails in most of the countries which
adopted the civil law. In Germany, under the first Reich, the
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judges attempted to protect the individual from police power,
but the effort was rather short-lived. The judges lost their
power during the police-state of the eighteenth century. Even
after the Konstitutionalismus of the nineteenth century the
idea was advanced that Reichstaat, itself, meant individual
protection from the executive through the legislature and the
judiciary, but it did not mean the protection of the indi-
vidual from the legislature through the judiciary.5 Indeed,
under the Meiji Constitution of Japan the judiciary was are-
cluded from reviewing the actions of the administration. The
civil-law countries had a different feeling for the administra-
tion from that which America and England had. Consequently, it
is to be expected that one would place its confidence in the
administration while the other placed its confidence in the
judiciary.
The common-law countries took great pride in the fact
that public officials were not covered by the immunity of the
sovereign. The fact that the officials could be sued in
damages for acts performed within the scope of their official
duties was viewed as a significant triumph of the rule of law.
"Every official," said Dicey, "from the Prime Minister down to
the constable or collector of taxes is under the same res on-
sibility for every act done without legal justification."
In the United States also official responsibility was the
accepted doctrine. Justice Holmes, speaking for the Massa-
chusetts court in Miller v. Horton, took the position that
the Health Statute either could provide for payment or ".
if it does not, may leave those who act under it to proceed at
their peril." At the stage neither the English nor the Ameri-
can courts were impressed by the idea that official respon-
sibility would have the effect of making the officer timid in
his official actions. The knowledge that his official acts
may open up this officer to a personal damage action, may well
cause an officer to approach his duties with extreme caution,
timidity and with reduced efficiency. The civil law thought
that this circumstance was a major consideration and, there-
fore, the judiciary should not interfere in the problems of
administration. Unlike the civil law, the common law was very
slow in recognizing this result, and consequently placed its
primary emphasis on the official being amenable to the law.
In this light the doctrine of Miller v. Horton is still
followed in a number of American states, although it has been
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repudiated by a good number of the American states as well. 10
However, it should be noted that on the Federal level, Miller
v. Horton no longer represents the accepted view. The Federal
courts have come to realize, what the civil law had long since
recognized, that the threat of personal actions against the
officer deprives the public generally of effective and effi-
cient administration.
Thus, in Spaulding v. Vilas,11 a defamation action, the
court granted a limited immunity to a post office official
against an action questioning his statements made in line of
duty. It was thought that Spaulding v. Vilas did not give an
immunity from tort actions in general, but was merely an ex-
pression of the doctrine of privilege, an integral part of the
law of defamation. This view may require some re-thinking in
the light of the court's broad language in a much later case.
In Barr v. Matteo,12 another defamation case where the com-
plaint also alleged malice, Mr. Justice Harlan, speaking for
the majority, said:
The reason for the recognition of the privilege has
been often stated. It has been thought important
that officials of government should be free to
exercise their duties unembarrassed by the fear of
damage suits in respect to acts done in the course
of those duties--suits which would consume time and
energies which would otherwise be devoted to govern-
mental service and the threat of which might appre-
ciably inhibit the fearless, vigorous and effective
administration of policies of government. . .
We are told that we should forbear from sanctioning
any such rule of absolute privilege lest we open
the door to wholesale oppression and abuses on the
part of unscrupulous government officials. It is
perhaps enough to say that fears of this sort have
not been realized within the wide area of govern-
ment where a judicially formulated absolute
privilege of broad scope has long existed. It
seems to us wholly chimerical to suggest that what
hangs in balance here is the maintenance of high
standards of conduct among those of public service.
To be sure, as with any rule of law which attempts
to reconcile fundamentally antagonistic social
policies, there may be occasional instances of
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actual injustice which will go unredressed, but we
think the price a necessary one to pay for the
greater good. And there are, of course, other
sanctions than civil tort suits available to deter
the executive official who may be prone to exercise
his functions in an unworthy and irresponsible
manner.1 3
The above quoted excerpt from Mr. Justice Harlan's
opinion shows how far the American court has moved from Miller
v. Horton, and much farther, indeed, from Chief Justice Holt
and Lord Mansfield. In Ashby v. White, 14 Chief Justice Holt
declaimed that "if public officers will infringe man's rights,
they ought to pay greater damages than other men, to deter and
hinder other officers from like offenses." Some four decades
later, Lord Mansfield put the proposition even stronger. Said
Lord Mansfield:
Therefore, to lay down in an English court of Justice
such a monstrous proposition, as that a governor act-
ing by virtue of letters patent under the great seal
is accountable only to God and his own conscience;
that he is absolutely despotic and can spoil,
plunder and affect his Majesty's subjects both in
their liberty and property, with imp unity, is a
doctrine that cannot be maintained. 5
England did establish such "monstrous proposition," however,
a hundred years later in Chatterton v. Secretary of State of
India.16 The United States Supreme Court and the English
courts, at least in one area, have moved closer toward the
civil law's position that those who are charged with the duties
of government should be left free to govern. The language of
the United States Supreme Court is broad enough and the reason-
ing of the Court is general enough to accommodate the civil
law's position as to general tort actions outside of defama-
tion.
Both the United States and England started with the con-
cept that the sovereign could not be sued without its consent.
The English based the immunity on the old feudal concept that
"the King can do no wrong." This concept was very much like
the French concept under the Ancien Regime that "le roi est
honest homme." In the beginning this was a privilege which
adhered to the person of the king, but when the Crown became
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the institutionalization of the King, the immunity which
adhered to the King's person, adhered to the Crown. The same
line of reasoning can be applied to the French in the post-
revolutionary era. But the reason why the United States
adopted the concept is more obscure. There was no historical
basis for the importation of the personal immunity of the King
in the United States. This may be one of the great ironies of
history that a nation founded on the desire to escape a
despotic executive, immediately thereafter grants to the exe-
cutive an immunity. It has been rationalized by some that the
immunity was a natural growth, for one could not have an action
against the source on which the right depended. Thus, since
all rights emanated from the state, it was illogical to claim
that one could complain of a wrong as against the state which
granted the right.17 This writer submits that for the most
part these explanations are just rationalizations. It is more
likely that the concept crept into American jurisprudence as a
part of the general importation of the common law.
However, it was not long before most courts realized that
complete immunity had the effect of leaving a large number of
its citizens without a remedy in numerous situations in which
the governmental interest came into competition with the
interest of the individual. The mere withholding of the
immunity of the sovereign from the sovereign's servants was
not a sufficient answer or proper solution to the problem.
Frequently the official was not able to respond in damages.
This circumstance led the parties to make direct applications
for relief to Parliament or to Congress for the correction of
administrative wrongs. This practice was cumbersome and to
some extent was expensive. Consequently, both England and the
United States found it necessary to provide some method where-
by the citizen could seek redress for alleged wrongs of the
State. The wrongful collection of taxes was a great impetus
behind the move, and was one of the compelling reasons behind
the establishment of the United States Court of Claims. Both
common-law countries came to this conclusion in contracts long
before they were willing to relax the immunity in the area of
torts. England allowed suits against the government in con-
tracts in the late eighteen hundreds, along about the same
time that the United States created the Court of Claims.
In tort, however, the United States did not enact the
Federal Tort Claims Act until 1946 and England did not enact
its Crown Proceedings Act until 1947. The main thrust of
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these Acts can be readily identified as a desire to make the
government liable for the torts of its servants. Thus the
effort was to place the common-law citizen more nearly similar
to that of the civil-law citizen. Yet even under these Acts a
great deal of difficulty remained.
The Crown Proceedings Act of 1947 in both England and
Scotland drew a distinction between agencies of government, as
well as imposing or retaining some limitations upon the type
of action which may be brought and upon the remedies available
against the Crown. The United States, also, has imposed
limitations on the type of actions which can be brought. On
the Federal level, for example, mandamus can only be brought
in the District Court for the District of Columbia, and in
some instances injunction will not lie at all. 18 Nevertheless,
classification of agencies is more important under the Crown
Proceedings Act than it is under the Federal Tort Claims Act.
In England, those agencies which are not classified as Crown
agencies or as Crown Servants are admittedly outside the scope
of the Crown Proceedings Act of 1947. The regulation of these
agencies can only be discovered in a wide range of case law
and statutes.
The test for distinguishing these agencies is not too
clear, but Tomlin v. Hannafordl9 suggests that the true test
is the degree of control exercised by the Minister over the
agency. This appears to be particularly true of the public
corporations in the absence of statute. Where the enabling
statute is silent, the courts usually consider a number of
factors, includinq but not limited to the following: does the
Crown appoint the members of the corporation? Can it levy
rates? Is the property vested in the Crown? Whether the
funds are received from the Crovin and must they be returned to
and audited by the Government? Does it have discretionary
powers of its own which can be exercised independently without
consulting any representative of the Crown? Whether the cor-
poration is incorporated under the ordinary company legisla-
tion or whether its functions were formerly performed by
private enterprise? But even considering all these factors,
generally public corporations of the type commonly called
commercial will not be entitled to the privilege of the Crown,
while as to corporations of the Social Service type may be
more readily regarded as servants of the Crown.20
In some instances, it should be noted, that these
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difficulties have been relieved by specific statutes. For
example, the Electricity Act of 1957, the Television Act of
1954, and the Atomic Energy Authority Act of 1954, provide
that these public corporations do not have Crown status or do
not function on behalf of the Crown and shall not be entitled
to the privilege of the Crown.
The Federal Torts Claims Act of the United States also
places limitations on the type of actions for which recovery
can be obtained. For example, usually actions based on the
administrator's act of omission are not subject to suit. The
same can be said of acts which involve a wide range of dis-
cretion. The courts feel that in conscience it should not
substitute judicial discretion for that which the legislature
has entrusted to the executive. In addition, American courts
in administrative matters have a tendency to draw a distinc-
tion between the planning or policy stage of administration
and the execution stage of the administrative process.21
Under this distinction the court can and did hold that govern-
mental immunity would preclude a suit for damages for negli-
gence in a policy decision to ship fertilizer despite
attendant risk, and the consequent Texas City explosion.2 2
The civil-law countries and England could not have
reached this result under their present approach to administra-
tion. Even though the Crown Proceedings Act creates greater
problems in classification of agencies than does the Federal
Tort Claims Act, yet once the classification had been made,
the distinction drawn in Dalehite would probably not impress
the English judges. Certainly it would not impress the
Conseil d'Etat. Even in the United States the Court subse-
quently has shown an unwillingness to follow the Dalehite lead.
On at least two occasions the Court has veered away from Dale-
hite without overruling it.2 3 The feeling seems to be that
even government must perform its "good Samaritan" tasks in a
careful manner.2 4
Another area in which the English, the American and
probably the civil-law courts may have taken a different
approach has been in the area of recovery. Even here this
difference, if any, may be more apparent than real. In the
United States and in the civil-law countries, once the judg-
ment is rendered it is collected in the same manner as all
other judgments are collected. However, in England, the
Crown Proceedings Act of 1947 left the common-law rule, that
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no execution could issue aqainst the Crown, untouched. There-
fore, even if the agency should be amenable to the Act, re-
covery rests only in the duty of the agency to pay. Section
25(3) provided that when an order is made by any court against
the Crown for the payment of a sum of money, then the proper
officer of the court should deliver up a certificate to that
effect to the other party affected. On delivery of the order
to the person acting as Solicitor of the Crown, the department
incurs a duty to pay the sum. The Act also provided that no
execution or attachment or process in the nature thereof
should issue from any court for the enforcement of any payment
by the Crown of any money or cost due under an order of court.
In addition, Section 2(2) imposes liability for breach of a
statutory duty upon the Crown only in those instances where
the statutory provision in question is binding upon other per-
sons as well as the Crown. Obviously this provision is not
fulfilled by Section 25(3) of the Act. Therefore, any re-
covery under the Act as against the Crown is binding only on
the conscience of the sovereign. 25 But as pointed out earlier,
this may be of little or no difficulty. For in practically
every instance the agency involved pays. "Le roi est honest
homme!"
It should be noted that as against local authorities,
which are not classified as Crown servants, execution can be
levied against them. It appears that this phase of the
problem did not bother the English courts; once the right of
action for wrongful acts was awarded, execution necessarily
followed. So from the time of Mersey Dock, etc. v. Gibbs2
local authorities were amenable to suit for their wrongful
acts on the theory that they were just corporations and con-
sequently should be liable as corporations. Therefore,
England never had anything to parallel the American distinc-
tion of "proprietory" and "governmental" functions. In the
United States, municipal corporations, even in the absence of
statutes, have been held liable for wrongful acts in the fur-
therance of "proprietory" functions, but immune from such
suits for wrongs done in the furtherance of its "governmental"
functions. The differences between these two functions are
sometimes indefinable. But yet, these differences have per-
mitted Ohio not to impose liability on a municipality for in-
jury caused by a fire truck on its way to a fire (govern-
mental) and at the same time impose liability on the munici-
pality for injury caused by a fire truck returning from a
fire (proprietory).2 7 It is believed that Mersey Docks
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blessedly daved Enaland from such distinctions.
After Morsey Dock, there appears to have developed a prin-
ciple that if the property of the local authority was acquired
for a particular purpose or on trust, it would be immune from
taking in satisfaction of the general liabilities of the
authorities. The local Government Act of 1933 attempted to
abolish this special treatment of the particular purpose
property of the local authorities. However, as a practical
matter it still exists. Under this Act charges against this
type of property must have the consent of the Minister before
they are levied, so in the practice the Minister merely with-
holds his consent as to this type of property. Consequently,
the remedy of creditors against the authority lies primarily
against the revenue rather than against the capital. Section
211 of the 1933 Act limited the rights of mortgagees to the
appointment of receivers who will be concerned only with the
revenue. In case of default, it appears that the proper
remedy lies in an order of mandamus which would direct the
levying of2 ates sufficient to meet the demands upon the
authority.- But mandamus, being an extraordinary remedy, is
discretionary and a delay in application for it may result in
its not being issued.2 9 As a practical matter, it is a very
rare occasion where any successful litigant against a local
authority has been unable to collect. The result is about the
same as in any other country.
The big difference between the United States and England
is in the status of the police. In the United States, the
police are identified with the municipality and the municipa-
lity may in 5ome instances be responsible for the actions of
the police.3U So the police are covered by the general issue
as to whether the immunity applies or not, based on the nature
of the particular function. In England it appears that the
constable occupies a rather peculiar position. Apparently he
is not a servant of the Crown and therefore is not covered by
the Crown Proceedings Act. Although he is paid partly by the
local authority and partly through grant in aid from the
national government, he is not considered a servant of either.
Therefore, it must be that he is subject to the control of the
Minister of Justice only. But this is in the main for direc-
tion purposes only, so in the case of wrongful acts the con-
stable seems to be suable as an individual. Although the
writer has found nothing to support him, he suspects that the
Minister of Justice or his department will usually assume the
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burden of the constable where the suit was for acts committed
in the line of duty.
Another interesting facet of the doctrine of governmental
immunity comes into focus when the action is between a citizen
and a foreign government or subdivision thereof. Usually when
the action is between the citizen and his own country, the
courts have made an effort to balance the two conflicting
interests. But once the element of the foreign government is
added, governmental immunity takes on new vitality. The Anglo-
American courts frequently grant the immunity to a foreign
sovereign usually for reasons such as: (1) foreign states are
equal and therefore are not amenable to each other, (2) such
suits would be vexatious to the peace of nations, or (3) such
suits would be an impingement on the dignity of the foreign
sovereign. 3 1 France has established the rule of sovereign
immunity where it can be shown that the state possesses an in-
dependent legal personality.3 2 With countries the immunity is
a customary international rule. Where the problems arise is
in connection with the political subdivisions of countries.
The Commonwealth countries evidently influenced by the doctrine
of the indivisibility of the Crown usually grant immunity to
political subdivisions. The United States has restricted the
application of the immunity on the theory that component parts
have no separate independence. 3 3 However, a determination by
the political departments of government that a subdivision is
independent will usually be recognized by the court.
In connection with foreign public corporations the im-
munity has been granted or withheld on the theory that the
corporation's acts were either public or private in nature.
The result of this is similar to that discussed earlier under
the American law of municipal corporations. Liability is made
to turn upon whether the act complained of was a public act or
a private act. England, however, extended the immunity to the
Tass Agency,34 even though the Soviet enabling act gave Tass
all the rights of a juristic person. In addition the Soviet
Ambassador to Great Britian had filed a certificate to the
effect that Tass was a department of the State exercising the
riqhts of a legal entity. The court may have thought that
this action would be embarrassing to the foreign sovereign,
since Tass was a department the sovereignty was indivisible.
On balance it appears that both the common-law countries and
the civil-law countries apply the doctrine of sovereign im-
munity quite consistently as a rule of international custom
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whenever a citizen is complaining of the acts of a foreign
sovereign or its instrumentality.3 5
Any comparative discussion of administrative law must of
necessity consider the vast difference between the common law
and the civil law in the area of procedure and structure for
the handling of administrative matters. It is in this area
that the common law lawyer finds that he is in less familiar
surroundings. On the whole, the common law and the civil law
are surprisingly close to each other as far as results and
substantive law are concerned. The method by which these
results are achieved is where the big difference occurs.
On the whole, the United States and England have developed
along parallel lines. The regular law courts have exercised
some restraint on the administrative process by means of judi-
cial review. The usual practice is to seek mandamus, cer-
tiorari or a declaratory judgment, in order to have the
administrative act either directed or set aside. The injunc-
tion device has received rather limited use on the Federal
level, usually because of the doctrine of indispensable parties
which, in effect would make any such action an action against
the government.31 Chief Justice Vinson has put it in this
fashion:
Since the sovereign may not be sued, it must .
appear that the action to be restrained or directed
is an action of the sovereign. The mere allegation
that the officer, acting officially, wrongfully
holds property to which the plaintiff has title does
not meet the requirement. True, it establishes a
wrong to the plaintiff. But it does not establish
that the officer, in committing that wrong, is not
exercising the power delegated to him by the
sovereign. If he is exercising such power, the
action is the sovereign's and a suit to enjoin it
may not be brought unless the sovereign has con-
sented.37
Both England and America have developed their administrative
law through the normal channels of the common law and by way
of analoqies with private law. This approach once led Mr.
Justice Jackson as late as 1955 to comment that ". . . . the
United States and England had backed into the whole problem
(of administrative law) rather than face it."
3 8
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On the other hand, France approached the problem of ad-
ministration in an entirely different manner. The French
created a series of courts outside its ordinary judicial
system which were to specialize in administrative matters.
The system so unfamiliar to the lawyer trained solely in the
common law can best be understood by considering the back-
ground out of which it arose and by looking at its present
structure. During the Ancien Regime the King transferred all
actions involving his officers to his council, thereby giving
the officer an immunity from suit in the ordinary court. Then
Article 75 of the Constitution of Year VIII of the revolution
(1800) provided that "public officers . . . may not be sued
for acts performed officially except by virtue of a decision
authorizing such suits by the Council of State and in such
cases suits may be brought in the ordinary courts."3 9 But,
after the fall of Napoleon III, one of the first acts was the
Decree of September 19, 1870, repealing Article 75. It was
thought by some of the leading politicians, such as Leon Blum,
that the intent of the September Decree was to make the French
Administrative Official liable for his actions in the ordinary
courts, much as the English and Ameri an public officials were
answerable to the common-law courts.48 If this were the in-
tent of the Decree, it fell short of its mark. For in the
period of three short years the Decree was rendered nugatory
by the decision in the Pelletier case of July 28, 1873.41 In
this case the Cour de Cassation, influenced more by the con-
cept of fundamental law and history, declared that the funda-
mental doctrine of the separation of powers rendered the court
incompetent to adjudge the regularity of administrative acts.
Despite the impetus of the September Decree, the court refused
to entertain the Pelletier complaint. The Pelletier case is
without doubt a most significant factor in the development of
the French administrative process.
Since the separation of powers doctrine rendered the
ordinary courts powerless to hear and determine administrative
matters, the Countil of State was left free to work with the
whole cloth of administrative law. This was primarily so be-
cause the French Civil Code was drafted at a time when the con-
tinent's major concern was with the private law. Although the
Code was supreme and comprehensive in its area, leaving to
the ordinary courts only the duty of filling up the gaps, the
Code gave little thought to the realm of public law. This is
understandable in the light that the Roman law, a sophisti-
cated system indeed, gave little thought to public law.
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True, classical Roman law did differentiate between ius
publicum and ius privatum. But, it could hardly be regarded
that ius publicum was a system of law at all. What relief
that was given, was given through the funds in the Imperial
Treasure, fiscus. So direct appeals were made to the fiscus,
and it more or less compensated as it saw fit. Indeed, there
was no formalized system in administration in the sense that
the private law of the Romans was systemized. Since the Roman
law was the precursor of the French civil law, it is almost to
be expected that the Code would give little or no concern to
the realm of public law. Consequently, the Conseil d'Etat was
left to develop the public law on the basis of inclusions and
exclusions, much the same as the English courts developed the
common law. Since the Conseil d'Etat dealt exclusively with
administration, it was able to build up a great body of judge-
made law with special application to the problems of admini-
stration. To this writer it is interesting that the Conseil
d'Etat on a couple of instances was able to fashion a sort of
"equal protection" concept, even without benefit of a Four-
teenth Amendment.
Since the common law does not have a body which might be
classified as the counter-part of the Conseil d'Etat, it may be
well, at this point, to look at the Conseil in its role,
structure and organization. Probably the closest thing we
have to the Conseil is the United States Tax Court. The
United States Tax Court is the successor of the old Board of
Tax Appeals, which was described in its enabling Act as an
"independent agency in the executive branch of government." 4 2
The Judicial Act of 194843 changed the name of the agency from
the Board of Tax Appeals to the United States Tax Court and
bestowed the title of "Judge" on its members. But, the Act
left that section which described the old agency as an inde-
pendent agency in the executive branch of aovernment un-
touched. But even so, the Tax Court cannot be classified as
the counter-part of the Conseil d'Etat because appeals from
the Tax Court can be taken to the United States Court of
Appeals and thence to the United States Supreme Court. The
Conseil d'Etat is the Supreme Court for administration. In
some instances, as we will see later, the Conseil d'Etat has
the first and last word in matters administrative. So by and
large, the Conseil d'Etat is a unique institution to the
common-law lawyer.
The Conseil d'Etat is an administrative body with a great
38
deal of independence. It is staffed by career personnel who
elected training in administration during their period of
study. The Conseil recruits annually from the graduates of
the National School of Administration. The school was set up
by the French Government in 1945 as an administrative labora-
tory to prepare the young student for service in the admini-
stration. Admission to the National School is by annual
competitive examinations and a fixed number of the graduates
of the school are selected annually for service in the
Conseil d'Etat.44 The Conseil consists of one hundred sixty-
one members, and that membership consists of three types of
members; i.e., the Councilors of State, the Maitres de
Requetes and the Auditors. These three positions are also the
three echelons within the Conseil. 4 5 The promotions within
the Conseil follow in that order; the graduate of the National
School of Administration comes in as an Auditor and then is
promoted up the scale.46
It should be noted that the whole Conseil is not a court,
the council has divided itself into two sections; i.e., the
Administration Section and the Judicial Section. It is the
Judicial Section which has the jurisdiction over the develop-
ment of the law of administration and therefore is the section
with which this paper is primarily concerned. Even though the
council has divided itself into an administrative and judicial
section, it is error to think that the two divisions are com-
partments which are entirely separate and distinct. The
judicial section has a great deal of independence, but it is
still a part of the council and some exchange of experience
does take place between the two sections. The members of the
judicial section are not as readily open to the criticism that
they do not understand the problems of the Administration, as
are the common-law judges. But despite this exchange of ex-
perience, the judicial section is quite independent of the
administration.
Originally the judicial section of the Conseil handled
all of the litigation in the area of administration; in that
respect the council was the court of first and last resort in
matters involving administrative law. But, through the years
the case load became so heavy that the council was running
about three to four years behind docket. So the Reform Act of
1954 was enacted to relieve the Conseil of some of the tremen-
dous load. Under this Act the twenty-three prefectorial
councils of seven overseas departments were transferred into
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Tribuneaux Administratifs. These administrative tribunals re-
placed the Conseil as first degree judge of administrative
act, but the Conseil remained as a court of appeals from these
tribunals.
Professor Langaad, University of the Saar,47 reports that
the council now has a three-fold function: (1) it is a Court
of Ascription (judge d'attribution) for administrative litiga-
tion arising in extra metropolitan territories, and also for
those cases directly submitted to it by law; (2) it is a court
of appeals from the Tribuneaux Administratifs; and (3) it is
the Supreme Court of all bodies having administrative juris-
diction. The ideal of an administrative body, outside the
judicial organization, being a final arbiter of the rights of
the individual against the administration, is a little diffi-
cult for the common-law lawyer to apprehend. Yet, it is this
factor which seems to have made the French system so effective.
Since the ordinary courts were not subordinate to the
council, the question arose as to what would happen if an in-
dividual would submit an issue to the ordinary court and the
court would not decline jurisdiction. Would not then the
whole system break down? To resolve this difficulty, the
French created another body known as the Cour de Conflit,
whose sole function is to resolve the problems of conflicting
jurisdiction. The Cour de Conflit consists of nine members,
four chosen from the Cour de Cassation, four from the Conseil
d'Etat and one, the President, is the Minister of Justice. So,
if an individual would file an action in the Cour de Cassation
and the issue was raised that the case involved an administra-
tive matter, but the court would not decline jurisdiction,
then on motion the case would be transferred to the Cour de
Conflit. If the Cour de Conflit agreed that an administrative
matter was involved, the case would be withdrawn from the law
court. This would mean that the litigant, in order to secure
a determination of his problem, would have to start his action
anew before the Conseil d'Etat. At first blush this procedure
would appear to be a little clumsy, and indeed it can prove to
be time consuming and it may work some degree of hardship on
the poor litigant. But on reflection the procedure is not too
alien to that procedure of the common law when the actions of
law and equity were not integrated. The more serious objection
to this procedure may be that the motion to remove is available
to the administration alone. Nevertheless, this system has
made for a high degree of uniformity in French administrative
law.
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The Conseil d'Etat as an administrative court has a broad
jurisdiction. It cannot deal with matters concerning either
the legislative function--including the conduct of the legis-
lative assembly and the relation of government with the
assembly--or judicial functions--including the police judi-
ciare, or international matters. Yet, within the administra-
tive field so defined the Conseil d'Etat claims and exercises
an absolute and universal competence. No administrative act
can be withdrawn from the council on the grounds of "act of
government" or "reason of state." Thus it seems impossible
that Liversidge v. Anderson4 8 could have happened in France.
The fact that the public official has great latitude of dis-
cretion does not affect the power of the council. Neither the
question of "subjective" nor "objective" power,49 which the
English courts recognize, nor the distinction between planning
and execution, which was so important to the United States
Court in Dalehite, appears to deter the council.
When Professor Hamson50 raised these distinctions with
Mr. Le Tourneur, a noted French avocat, during an interview,
Mr. Le Tourneur appeared quite baffled by the question. At
first he thought that he had misunderstood the question, but
when assured that he had not, he could not comprehend the
distinction. Apparently one accustomed to dealing with a body
specifically trained in administration has found it well
equipped to deal with such subtleties of administration. The
Conseil d'Etat did decide one case under the Ordonnance of
October 14, 1944, which gave to the executive the power to
intern "les individus dangereaux pour la defence nationale ou
la securite publique." Neither the largeness of the power nor
the broad arant of discretion deterred the council in its in-
quiry.
There are generally two actions which are brought before
the administrative court. The Recours de pleine Jurisdiction
is an action for damages and is brought when the individual
asserts that he has been injured as a result of the fault of
the service. If such assertion is sustained, damages are
awarded. The other action--recour pour exces de pouvior--is
an action to annul an ultra vires administrative act. The
nature of this action is primarily to have the action set
aside; it raises a question as to the legality of the act, it
does not seek damages.
This is an action which the common-law lawyer may find
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peculiar. The plaintiff can file an action with the appro-
priate administrative court asking that the administrative act
be condemned. From that point on the plaintiff is more like
a spectator of an argument between the council and the parti-
cular administrator. This is a sort of an "action in rem";
the Conseil d'Etat develops its own dossier of the case and
produces the evidence in an inquisitorial manner rather than
in the adversary manner with which the common-law lawyer is
familiar. The council's office of Avocat Generale, who is a
sort of institutionalized amican curae, usually sums up the
case for the judges of the Conseil. The Avocat Generale
usually does an exceptional job of this, it has been suggested
that if one wants to know what a particular case was really
about, the summation of the Avocat Generale will reveal more
information than the court's opinion. In these cases before
the council, the litigant can take part, of course, and often
does. He is entitled to see every document submitted to the
council and can reply to every argument advanced by the
Minister, but he need not, nor is he required to be represented
by counsel. The inquisitorial procedure before the council,
in pasence, means that there is very little law of evidence,
and in fact there is no rule of parol evidence before the
council. If this seems strange, it is to be remembered that
the Conseil is familiar with the problems of administration.
In the United States in a proceeding before an administrative
agency, the exclusionary rules of evidence are not strictly
applicable on the theory that the agency is an expert in its
field and is capable of sorting out the evidence. As an ex-
pert it is not so easily led astray as a lay jury might be.
Indeed the Federal Courts have held that an administrative
agency may utilize, as a basis for its finding of fact (which
is binding on the court), evidence which would normally be
relied on by reasonable people.5 1 "It is convincing," said
one court, "not lawyers' evidence which is required."5 2 With
this view in mind, the French inquisitorial procedure before
the administrative courts, admittedly an expert, is not quite
as shocking to the common-law lawyer as it might appear to be
at first sight.
As stated earlier in this paper, the law courts from the
passage of the Basic Law of August 16-24, 1790, were pre-
cluded from interfering with the administration. The Basic
Law provided:
Judicial functions are and always will remain
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distinct from administrative function. Judges may
not under the penalty of forfeiture of office,
interfere in any manner with the functions of ad-
ministrative bodies, or summon administrators
before it in connection with the exercise of their
jurisdiction.
When the Pelletier Case5 3 declared this concept more funda-
mental than the decree of September, 1870, the problem arose
as to who was to decide the cases involving official acts
which were not only ultra vires but were entirely foreign to
the service. It was here that the regular law courts filled
the gap, by developing the doctrine of Administrative Trespass
(voie de fait). In fact, this is basically two doctrines.
The first is to the effect that if an administrative official
performs an act devoid of legality to a deqree that it reduces
the administrative quality to the naked fact that the act
arose within the administration, provided the act is not of a
general regulatory nature, then the act is disclaimed as non-
administrative. The act is then the fault of the person
(faute de personnelle) and the ordinary law courts can take
cognizance of the action without running afoul of the Basic
Law. This doctrine is somewhat similar to the theory behind
the earlier common law view expressed in Miller v. Horton.5 4
The Administration authorizes only acts within the realm of
legality, if the administrator goes beyond the reasonable
bounds of legality, then he should bear the full responsibi-
lity for his acts, i.e., faute de personnelle. It should be
remembered that the French do not draw lines for personal
fault as narrowly as the common law did in the Miller v.
Horton era. In France, Miller v. Horton would have been
handled by the Conseil d'Etat.
The second doctrine is, if the degree of illegality is so
high as to go beyond the domain constitutionally occupied by
the aagregate of administrative authority, the act then be-
comes a usurpation of power and therefore non-existent. The
act is a nullity. Since it is no longer administrative, the
law courts are competent to adjudicate the rights of the
parties, again without running afoul of the Basic Law. It
should be pointed out here that usurpation of power is not the
same as excess of power. Excess of power is still administra-
tive and is within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Conseil
d'Etat. But usurpation of power is beyond the administration
and the law courts have jurisdiction. Harry Street5 5 has put
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it this way: "A mere violation des formes would be an excess
de pouvior but would remain administrative; 1'absence totale
des formes, i.e., something outside the administrative sphere,
would be voie de fait."
The doctrine of Administrative Trespass is an important
doctrine in that it fills the gap that might have been left in
administrative relief. There may be a voie de fait for which
the administration alone can be sued, and the remedy may be
not only damages but an order for the administration to cease
and desist from the continuance of a complained of activity.
L'Action Francaise56 illustrates the workings of this con-
cept. A Paris newspaper had been seized by the order of the
Paris Prefect of Police. ^ In the civil action brought by the
publisher, it was held that there was no faute de personnelle,
but since the order authorized seizure anywhere although no
menace to public safety was either present or contemplated,
there was a voie de fait, for which the administration was
liable in the civil courts. In the common law world the
order may have been stricken on the grounds that it did not
provide adequate standards, but in the absence of finding
fault, no basis for damages would have been present. In addi-
tion the common law courts could have easily found this to be
a discretionary order and the courts should not substitute its
discretion for that of the executive.
In looking at the French administrative structure, it
should be kept in mind that in addition to the exception of
the voie d fait, the jurisdiction of the Conseil d'Etat has
also been limited by statute. The liability of the state for
acts of teachers to students is decided by the civil courts by
virtue of statute.5 7 Claims against the railroads, postal and
telegraph services are dealt with in the same fashion.5 8 War
damages, damages caused by manoeuvresm soldiers pension rights,
and workmen's compensation are all enforceable in the civil
courts rather than the Conseil d'Etat by virtue of specific
statutes.59
Aside from these two exceptions--voie de fait and statu-
tory liability--the French administrative system has two
meritorious factors worthy of common law consideration. They
are the tendency of the Conseil to base administrative
liability on the risk created by the administration rather
than on the fault of the agency;60 and the subjection of all
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administrative bodies, whether central or local, to the same
law. Through these two factors, the French, who under the
Ancien Regime, began with almost complete immunity for public
officials, have now approached almost complete responsibility
for public officials. Meanwhile, the common law world, which
originally provided no immunity for public officials, has now,
at least in defamation and perhaps in other torts, moved toward
complete immunity.
The French influence can be seen in other civil law
countries. Article 96(1) of the Basic Law of West Germany61
created separate courts, similar to the French Conseil d'Etat,
for administration, tax, labor, and social matters. Admini-
strative law in West Germany is developed, like in France, by
a body which is an expert in the field. In addition West
Germany also has a method--Constitutional Complaint--whereby
an individual may initiate directly before the civil court a
complaint that his constitutional rights have been violated.
This action is not too dissimilar to the French doctrine of
voie de fait, and like administrative suits in the United
States the action is conditioned on the exhaustion of admini-
strative remedies and on the doctrine of ripeness. This last
item may reflect the effects of American occupation. But,
under the action the court can annul or order a new trial, this
writer is not sure whether the court could also issue a damage
award.
In at least one of the new nations, it is noted that the
Supreme Court of the Ivory Coast is divided into four chambers:
Constitutional Chamber, Judicial Chamber, Administrative
Chamber, and the Chamber of Claim.6 2 Of course, this is to be
expected since the Ivory Coast has had a past of French in-
fluence.
The Meiji Constitution of Japan vested a rather limited
jurisdiction over administrative matters in a separate admini-
strati e court, but the Constitution of 1946 abolished that
court.3 The Constitution of 1946, reflecting American occu-
pation influence, vested jurisdiction over administration in
the ordinary law courts. Since the war, administration suits
in Japan, like West Germany under the Constitutional Complaint,
have increased to the point that these suits comprise the bulk
of the court's work. The number of administrative cases be-
fore the Japanese courts from May 3, 1947, to December 31,
1957, totaled more than 17,916.64
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The separate system of courts for administrative matters--
the heart of the civil law system--has in recent years re-
ceived some support from common-law lawyers. In both the
United States and England there have been proposals for the
creation of separate administrative courts. Professor Robson,
before the Committee on Minister's Powers, advocated the
creation of an administrative Appeals Court which would be
grafted onto the Privy Council. Under this proposal the
English High Court would be divested of its supervisory and
appellate jurisdiction over administrative matters. Thus, the
administrative tribunal would be vested with the ultimate con-
trol of administrative matters. 65
In the United States as well, there has been proposed an
administrative court. Under the proposal the court would have
jurisdiction over (1) cases involving the judicial review of
administrative action otherwise cognizable in other federal
courts, other than the Supreme Court, and (2) cases involving
the civil enforcement of rules, orders or investigative demands
of administrative agencies. 6 6 It is doubted that any of these
proposals will get too far.
As indicated earlier, the civil law tendency to base
aovernmental liability on the risk created by the administra-
tion rather than on the concept of fault of the agency, is a
factor worthy of common law consideration. It is uncon-
scionable that one should be required to suffer requieted and
injury inflicted within the risk of the administrative action,
on the theory that the act causing the injury was discre-
tionary or an act of government. Dalehite serves no societal
interest. Even the "Good Samaritan" should be required to do
his good deeds carefully. If the concept of liability on the
basis of risk created is imported into the common law, then
there is no need for the separate court system as has been
proposed for the United States and England. There is nothing
sacrosanct about separate courts, except that the French have
had a background recognizing a sort of reserve power in the
executive. The common law has never had such; the keystone
of the common law has been the concept of the limited execu-
tive. The common law courts are not unfamiliar with the con-
cept of strict liability and are quite capable of applying
similar principles to an action between the state and its
citizens. This writer is cognizant of the fact that those
charged with the duty of government should be left free to
govern. But, at the same time, like Lord Mansfield, he thinks
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that it is a "monstrous proposition" that a public official is
"accountable only to God and his own conscience." It is a
doctrine which should no longer have a place in the common law.
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THE ROLE OF THE STATE-SUPPORTED
NEGRO LAW SCHOOL
Milton E. Johnson
During the era of the "separate but equal doctrine" in
public education in the United States, inherited from the deci-
sion in Plessy v. Ferquson1 several Southern States established
separate law schools for the exclusive training of Negroes in
legal education. The courts continued to restrict the meaning
of the original doctrine when applying it to education until it
was totally rejected in the school segregation cases of 1954.2
Now that the state laws requiring and permitting segregation in
public education, including higher education solely on account
of race have been declared unconstitutional, the future of the
state law schools established for the training of Negroes only
have become a concern of many people in and out of education.
This is especially true in those states where the pattern of
segregation in all the law schools is no longer one hundred per
cent segregated. In order to make an appraisal of the worth of
these schools, perhaps it would be helpful to consider their
backgrounds, physical facilities, teachers, curricula, stu-
dents, etc. This paper is in light of present day conditions
and probable future needs. At the present there are five
state-supported law schools operating that were established
exclusively for Negroes. These are: The School of Law, North
Carolina College at Durham, Durham, North Carolina; The School
of Law, Texas Southern University, Houston, Texas; The School
of Law, Southern University and A. & M. College, Baton Rouge,
Louisiana; The School of Law, South Carolina State College,
Orangeburg, South Carolina; and The College of Law, Florida
A. & M. University, Tallahassee, Florida.
For a long time some of the Southern states practicing
segregation in public education provided out-of-state aid for
Negroes to attend universities outside of the state when train-
ing offered whites in the state was not provided for Negroes.4
Since the law in these states required separate but equal edu-
cational facilities for the races, this arrangement was con-
sidered by these states as equality of treatment in education.
In 1938, the Supreme Court, in the case of Missouri ex rel
Gaines v. Canada,5 began to cut at the very foundation of the
separate but equal theory of law in education by more strictly
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defining separate but equal. The State Supreme Court of
Missouri, in construing and applying the separate but equal
theory of law to education decided that substantial equality
was sufficient but there was a difference of opinion as to the
meaning of substantial equality by the State Supreme Court of
Missouri and the Supreme Court of the United States. In the
instant case, Gaines, a Negro citizen of the State of Missouri,
applied to enter the law school at the University of Missouri,
the state university attended solely by whites. There was no
law school provided at Lincoln University, a state university
for Negroes. The curators of Lincoln University were em-
powered and directed to establish a law school in connection
with the University whenever in their opinions it became
necessary and practicable. Pending such development, the cura-
tors were authorized to arrange for legal education of Negro
citizens and pay their tuition at law schools in adjacent
states where the training was equal to that obtainable at the
Missouri State University.
The curators of the state university, following the
state's law and policy of segregation in education, refused to
admit Gaines as a student in the law school of the State Uni-
versity of Missouri solely because of his race. He was a
graduate of Lincoln University and it was admitted that his
"work and credits at Lincoln University of Missouri would
qualify him for admission to the school of law of the Univer-
sity of Missouri if he were found otherwise eligible."
Although applying the separate but equal theory, the
Court speaking through Chief Justice Hughes, concluded that a
Neqro living in Missouri was entitled to study law at the
University of Missouri, a state school, because there was no
other law school maintained by the state which he could
attend. 6
The Court further concluded that the Fourteenth Amendment
was applicable by reason of state action through representa-
tives or aaents of the state denying a Negro admission to the
state university law school. Under the due process and the
equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, it was
discriminatory for the state to furnish a law school in the
state for whites and not furnish one within the state for
Negroes. The obligation of a state to give the protection of
equal laws can be performed only where its laws operate, that
is, within its own jurisdiction, and therefore the equality of
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right must be maintained within the state. Providing legal
education within the state for white residents while Negro
residents having the same qualifications were refused it there
and were required to go outside the state to obtain it, consti-
tuted denial of "equal protections of law," notwithstanding,
there was a limited demand in the state for the legal education
of Negroes, and notwithstanding state-made provisions for pay-
ment of tuition outside the state for Negroes desiring legal
training.
I
Recognizing the legal significance of the Gaines case,
the North Carolina General Assembly in 1939 amended the charter
of the North Carolina College for Negroes to read in part as
follows: ". . . Sec. 2, The Board of Trustees of the North
Carolina College for Negroes is authorized and empowered to
establish departments of law, pharmacy and library science at
the above-mentioned institution whenever there are applicants
desirous of such courses. The said Board of Trustees of North
Carolina College for Negroes may add other professional courses
from time to time as needed for the same is found and the funds
of the state will justify." 7 In 1925, the North Carolina
College for Negroes was made the first state-supported liberal
arts college in the South for the training of Negro students.
In accordance with the amended charter of North Carolina
College for Negroes, the North Carolina College Law School was
established in 1939 as a part of that institution and exclu-
sively for Negroes.8 Dean M. T. Van Hecke, who was at that
time Dean of the University of North Carolina Law School, was
responsible for setting up the North Carolina College Law
School with the first law teachers coming from the faculties
of the University of N rth Carolina Law School and Duke Uni-
versity School of Law. For lack of students the law school
did not operate until 1940 and has run continuously ever since.
During the 1940-41 session, the faculty was composed entirely
of members of the University of North Carolina Law School.
Three full-time resident Negro instructors and a full-time law
librarian were added to the faculty in 1941. In 1942, the
present Negro dean was appointed to succeed Dean Van Hecke who
resigned. At present the Law School has a full-time resident
dean, a staff of full-time faculty members, a librarian, and
the continued cooperation of the members of the faculty of the
Law Schools of the Universities of North Carolina and Duke
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along with the practicing attorneys of the City of Durham. The
Law School is fully accredited by the American Bar Association
and the State Board of Law Examiners.
The question of legal education for Negroes in the State
of Texas was raised in 1946 when Herman Marion Sweatt, a Negro,
applied for admission to the Law School of the University of
Texas, as a first year student. 10 It was admitted that he was
qualified in every way except that he was a Negro and Texas
law required the separation of the races in public education.
Therefore, Sweatt was denied admission. He promptly filed suit
in the State Court to compel his admission upon the ground that
its denial constituted an infringement of rights guaranteed to
him under the Fourteenth Amendment of the Federal Constitu-
tion. 1 1
While this action was pending the Legislature of Texas
passed the Act of 1947, S.B. 140 29, Acts 50th Leg., Vernon's
Ann. Civ. St., Art. 2643 b, which provided for the establish-
ment of a law school for Negroes at Austin, Texas, immediately
and for the establishment of "The Texas State University for
Negroes" at Houston, including the Law School when the Univer-
sity is established. Pursuant to this act, the school for
first year Negro law students was established at Austin.
Sweatt refused to attend after being notified and pursued his
case in court. The State Court found that the separate faci-
lities were substantially equal and denied the relief sought
whereupon 1he plaintiff appealed. The Court of Civil Appeals
affirmed. The Texas Supreme Court denied writ of error, but
the United States Supreme Court granted certiorari and re-
versed the State Court. 13 Subsequent to the trial of this
same case and before the decision was handed down by the United
States Supreme Court, a law school had been established at the
Texas State University for Negroes. However, the Court said:
Whether the University of Texas Law School is compared
with the original or the new law school for Negroes,
we cannot find substantial equality in the educa-
tional opportunities offered white and Negro law
students by the State. In terms of number of the
faculty, variety of courses and opportunity for
specialization, size of student body, scope of the
library, availability of law review and similar
activities, the University of Texas Law School is
superior.
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As heretofore stated, the School of Law of what is now
Texas Southern was created by act of the State Legislature,
March, 1947, as a part of the university. During the first
operation, the School of Law was located at Austin, Texas. On
September 1, 1948, the School of Law was transferred to Houston
where it is an integral part of the University campus.
It appears that the State of Louisiana, like North Caro-
lina, made preparations for and established a separate law
school for Negroes before applications by Negroes to attend
the State University law school were made.
As a result of the Gaines case,14 The State Board of Edu-
cation at its meeting in Lafayette, Louisiana, on October 22,
1916, approved the report and recommendations of a special
joint committee of the Board of Supervisors of Louisiana State
University and the State Board relative to establishment of a
School of Law at Southern University. Pursuant to this action,
the School of Law at Southern University commenced its first
year of operation September, 1947. 1 Except for the Law School
Southern was merely a college and not a university, and al-
though there was no statute or provision of the Constitution
of the State of Louisiana which by its terms denied the Negroes
admission to Louisiana State University and Agricultural and
Mechanical College, it was, however, the policy of the Board of
Supervisors to deny Negroes admission. The admissions to
Southern University were in like manner limited to Negroes by
the policy of the Beard of Supervisors.1 6
The State of South Carolina followed the usual pattern of
the Southern states in failing to establish legal education
for Negroes within the State until ordered to do so by the
courts. John H. Wrighten, a Negro resident and citizen of
South Carolina, over the age of 21, desirous of obtaining a
legal education, made application on July 2, 1946, to the Law
School of the University of South Carolina and was refused. 17
The refusal was based upon the fact that the applicant was a
Nearo and that the officials of the university were charged
with the duty of operating the same for white persons only,
and that they had no right or authority, under the Constitu-
tion and law of the State of South Carolina governing the
University, to accept the application of anyone other than a
white person. The applicant was qualified in every way except
for the fact that he was a Negro.
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After being refused admittance to the Law School of the
University of South Carolina solely because he was a Negro,
Wrighten brought an action in Court seeking a declaratory
judgment, injunctive relief, and damages.l8 The evidence
showed that the General Assembly of South Carolina, in its
general appropriation bills for the years 1945, 1946, and 1947,
provided that the Board of Trustees of the Colored Normal In-
dustrial, Agricultural and Mechanical College of South Carolina
shall use so much of the funds appropriated for Graduate and
Law School as is necessary to maintain and operate a law
school during the coming year.
2 0
Wrighten contended that it was probable that there would
not have been an adequate appropriation and certainly not a
mandatory requirement to establish a law school at State Col-
lege had not his case been brought. At the time the case was
heard in the Federal District Court for the Eastern District
of South Carolina, Columbia Division, no law school for
Negroes had been established by the State. The Court, there-
fore, ordered the State of South Carolina to furnish Wrighten
and others, in like plight, law school facilities equal to
those at the University of South Carolina, either at the Uni-
versity itself, the State College, or at any other satis-
factory institution in the State; otherwise, furnish none to
anyone; and that the State be given until September, 1947, to
21
comply.
Pursuant to the authorization and requirement of the
General Assembly of South Carolina of 1947, the School of Law
of South Carolina State College at Orangeburg, South Carolina,
was established and began operation on September 17, 1947.22
The school opened with nine students, a dean, secretary to the
dean, four full-time instructors, and a law librarian. The
physical plant now consists of a law building which cost
approximately $200,000, containing six classrooms, offices for
the entire Law School staff, two seminar rooms, a student
lounge, two reading rooms, librarian's office, moot court room
and stack rooms designed to accommodate a law library of
50,000 volumes.2 3 The School of Law is approved by the Ameri-
can Bar Association, The State Board of Law Examiners, and the
Veterans Administration. The library now contains approxi-
mately 20,000 volumes, and is a member of the American Asso-
ciation of Law Libraries.24
For admission as a regular student, an applicant is
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required to have completed at least three full years of college
work at an accredited institution and must take the Law School
Admission Test. However, no particular score on the test is
mentioned in the school bulletin as a requirement for enroll-
ment.
The College of Law, Florida Agricultural and Mechanical
University, Tallahassee, Florida, was established as a direct
result of court action by a Negro applicant to the College of
Law of the University of Florida, a State instiution pro-
viding legal training for the white race only. In April,
1949, Virgil D. Hawkins, a Negro citizen and resident of the
State of Florida, applied for admission to the first year class
of the College of Law of the University of Florida. His appli-
cation was denied by the Board of Control, the governing body
of the State University System, solely because he was a Negro
and the Constitution and statutes of Florida prohibited the
admittancg of any but white students to the University of
Florida. After being refused admission to the University of
Florida's Law School, the applicant initiated court action on
May 30, 1949, by filing a petition for a writ of mandamus in
the State Court to require the members of the State Board of
Control to admit him to the College of Law of the University
of Florida for attendance at a summer of 1949.27 The record
disclosed that Hawkins passed all the scholastic, moral and
other qualifications, except as to race and color, prescribed
by the laws of Florida and the rules and regulations of the
State Board of Control for admission to the first year class of
the College of Law of the University of Florida.
The case went to the Supreme Court of Florida three dif-
ferent times and that Court finally decided on August 1, 1952,
that the action be dismissed on the ground that at that time
there was in operation at the Florida Agricultural and Mechani-
cal College a duly established and tax-supported law school
maintained exclusively for Negroes, at which was offered law
courses similar in content and quality to those offered at the
College of Law of the University of Florida operated exclu-
sively for white students. 28 On petition for writ of cer-
tiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth
Circuit, the petition was granted and in a per curiam opinion
the judgment was vacated and the case remanded for considera-
tion in the light of the decision in Brown v. Board of Educa-
tion. 2 9
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The Florida Agricultural and Mechanical University College
of Law at Tallahassee, Florida, was established for the legal
training of Negro students on December 21, 1949, by the Board
of Control of the State of Florida, and the legislative appro-
priation for the building and operation of the college was
made in 1951.30
The College of Law was first known as The Division of Law
of Florida Agricultural and Mechanical College, and commenced
instruction with the beginning of the 1951-52 school year.3 1
At present the college is located in the center of the Univer-
sity campus and housed in a separate four-story building con-
taining three classrooms, a reading room, stack room, student
lounge, oot court room and individual offices for the
faculty.T
The College of Law is approved by the Supreme Court of
Florida and the American Bar Association. In order to qualify
for admission to the three-year course in law leading to the
degree of Bachelor of Laws, the applicant must have earned a
four-year baccalaureate degree from an accredited college or
university and a Law School Admission test score of at least
350, except in the case of veterans who will be considered for
admission after having completed 94 hours of satisfactory work
in an accredited college or university.3 3
II
Any discussion of the role or worth of an institution, in
the opinion of this writer, should consider the aims of that
institution, facilities, curriculum and other related matters
pertaining to its operation. It is evident from what has been
said so far that as far as the states were concerned, these
schools were established primarily to avoid integration in this
area at that particular time, and the fact that they have and
may serve other purposes is purely coincidental.
Facts and opinions stated in connection with the opera-
tion and achievements of the school are based on information
contained in their catalogues or bulletins, and information
gained by the writer from personal interviews and observations.
This writer has visited three of the schools in question,
talked with the deans of four, and has met with and discussed
matter concerning the schools with faculty members from all
five law schools within the past three years.
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Although these state-supported law schools accept non-
resident students, their primary objective is the training of
qualified men and women for the practice of law in the state
in which they are located. To this end, special emphasis is
placed on a comprehensive knowledge of the substantive and
procedural law of that state. However, students receive
thorough training in the fundamental principles, rules,
standards and techniques of law. The program of instruction
is designed to enable the student to practice law wherever the
Anglo-American system of law prevails. Non-resident students,
with the help of the instructors, can learn to make specific
application of the rules and principles learned to the law of
the states in which they expect to practice.
It appears that all of these law schools use variations of
the case method of instruction requiring students to partici-
pate actively in the classroom discussions.
Their curriculum varies to some extent in that Texas and
Louisiana, by virtue of their environment, offer mineral
rights, oil and gas, and some other courses peculiar to prac-
titioners of those states. All are accredited by the American
Bar Association and offer the basic courses required. The
entire curriculum is composed of required courses at all the
schools except Texas which has approximately twenty-five
elective courses from which a student may choose three hours
during the first semester of his senior year and two hours
during the second semester of his senior year. The number of
hours required for graduation are as follows: The School of
Law, North Carolina College at Durham, Durham, North Carolina,
93; The School of Law, Texas Southern University, Houston,
Texas, 86; The School of Law, Southern University and A. & M.
College, Baton Rouge, Louisiana, 92; The School of Law, South
Carolina State College, Orangeburg, South Carolina, 78; and
the College of Law, Florida A. & M. University, Tallahassee,
Florida, 96.
Three years of satisfactory work at an accredited college
are required for the admission of a degree candidate to the
study of law at the named law schools, except the College of
Law, Florida A. & M. University, which requires a degree from
an accredited college or university. All of the schools re-
quire applicants to take the Law School Admission Test and
have their score reported, but Florida is the only law school
in question with a minimum required score on the test and
that is 350.
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A combined-degree program is available at those law
schools that admit applicants with three years of college work
whereby the student may receive from the college or university
the degree of Bachelor of Arts or Bachelor of Science upon the
satisfactory completion of the first year of work in the law
school, and upon the successful completion of the third year's
work in law he will be granted the degree of Bachelor of Laws.
This arrangement does not pertain to students who have done
their undergraduate work in any other college unless such col-
lege itself is willing to grant them an undergraduate degree
after their first year in the law school.
The general cost per student per year to attend the Negro
law schools is shown in the following schedule, not including
books, supplies, personal and incidental expenses:
Total Total State Total Out- Total Out-of-
State Non-Board- of-State State Non-
Boarding ing Boarding Boarding
Students Students Student Student
North
Carolina $ 701.50 $ 251.50 $ 1,051.50 $ 601.50
Texas 529.00 146,00 829.00 446.00
Louisiana (Room & board 72.00 - 672.00
not available)
South
Carolina 731.50 337.50 931.50 537.50
Florida 650,00 180.00 1,000.00 530.00
The general cost of attending the state schools of law
operated for white students is higher than that for attending
the law schools operated by the state for Negroes, but it is
impossible to make an exact comparison because of the vari-
ations in living and boarding expenses at the white law
schools.
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In the schedule shown on page 62, the registration of the
law schools is listed by years as reported annually by John G.
Hervey under the heading "Law School Registration" in the
Journal 2J Lega1 Education. The columns under the heading of
each state supporting a law school for Negroes show the number
of students in the first, second and third year classes read-
ing from left to right. The number in the square shows the
number of special students and the number in parenthesis shows
the total registration for the year.
As to the physical facilities of the law schools, each
law school is housed in a separate building designed for the
law school and affords ample space for offices, classrooms,
moot court, law library, stacks, student lounge and reading
room for fifty or more students, except the School of Law,
Texas Southern University, which occupies spacious quarters on
the second floor of the south wing of the administration and
classroom building of the University which also offers ample
space for necessary operations. The libraries contain from
20,000 to 30,000 volumes each, and can seat from fifty to
seventy students in their respective reading rooms.
Approximately ninety-eight per cent of the teaching
faculties obtained their legal training at outstanding law
schools outside the South, and more than fifty per cent have
advanced law degrees or have done work toward same. Their
teaching experience varies, but in most cases it extends over
a period of from five years to the life of the school.
III
Notwithstanding criticism to the contrary, the Negro law
schools have made a definite contribution to the administra-
tion of justice, and to the civic and political life of the
communities served by the schools and their graduates.
In July of 1963, four professional men, one of whom was a
Negro doctor, filed action in Leon Circuit Court in Tallahas-
see, Florida, to have the College of Law, Florida A. & M.
University closed on the grounds that it was inferior and
illegally segregated. 3 4 The alleged inferiority was based on
the small percentage of graduates alleged to have passed the
bar after graduation and the fact that only one member of the
student body was qualified to be admitted to the University of
Florida Law School. It was further alleged that it cost the
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State of Florida $200,000 to produce one qualified lawyer at
the College of Law, Florida A. & M. University as opposed to
$20,000 at the University of Florida, that the taxpayers would
save $75,000 per year by closing the school, sending the one
qualified student to the University of Florida, and letting
the other students devote themselves to other studies or work
for which their qualifications fit them. The allegations were
denied as to statistics, and the suit was subsequently dis-
missed on grounds unknown to this writer.
Before making any statements as to the quality of contri-
butions made by Negro law schools to American communities
through their graduates and thereby assessing the often re-
peated claim that Negro law schools are inferior, and perhaps
so inferior that they do not justify their existence, we
should consider the following facts. The table below covers
only three of the law schools since the information is not
available for the others.3 5 However, it is the belief of the
writer that these schools are typical of the others.
Number Number Number Number Per Cent
Admitted Graduated Taking Bar Passing Passing
North
Carolina 84 Unknown 52 62
South
Carolina 39 39 29 74
Florida 169 32 22 17 77
(This schedule covers totals through 1962.)
In 1960, the percentage of those passing the bar examina-
tions nationally was 62 per cent of the total taking the ex-
aminations and 71 per cent of those taking the examination for
the first time. This was an increase over the years since
1952, when the figures were 59 per cent and 67 per cent, re-
spectively.3 6
From the above statistics the experience on bar examina-
tions of students from the Negro law schools compare favorable
with the national average. However, it is admitted that the
percentage of graduates of the Negro law schools passing the
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bar is less than that of the graduates of the state law schools
for whites. But when we consider the qualifications of the
students admitted, this difference of performance is readily
understandable.
In most cases the Negro law schools accept students with-
out regard for his LSAT score, and solely on the basis that he
satisfactorily passed his college work. Very few of these
students, if any, could qualify to enter the state law schools
for whites. In many cases those Negro students who can qualify
and are accepted enter the white law schools of the South
leaving fewer top ranking college students available to the
Negro law schools.
If we question the reasons for the poor showing on the
LSAT by most of the Negro college graduates, we will have to
go back to the student's earlier inferior education in a
segregated society with inferior facilities, his family back-
ground, culture and economics.
I was informed by a college president that the freshmen
entering his school averaged 675 on the admission test used
nationally, and the entrance requirement at the state colleges
for whites was 800. Only twenty-two out of approximately one
thousand Negro freshmen could qualify for entrance to the
white schools. Inferior education of Negroes at lower levels
and other social factors have severely cut down the number of
Negroes qualified to study at higher levels. However, failure
to respond well is not attributable to schooling alone--there
are other types of segregation and inequality which bear in-
fluence--but lower testing level obviously reflects deficient
education. On the average Negroes have done more poorly on
standard educational tests than others.3 7
Furthermore, when you consider that the standard entrance
tests are prepared by white men, it is possible that these
tests do not always reflect the potential of the Negro student.
Therefore, it has been possible for the Negro law schools to
take the mediocre student who might otherwise become lost in
the crowd, and, through a great deal of individual attention
which their size permits, qualify him as a lawyer or for ser-
vice in other areas where a legal education is required or
helpful.
The South is in great need of Negro lawyers to protect
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the rights of Negroes at a time when their cause is unpopular,
be it a property right, tort claim or civil rights, if the
opposition is white. The mere presence of a Negro lawyer in a
southern community helps the administration of justice and the
Negroes' participation in community affairs. With racial dis-
crimination so prevalent in the southern region, it is natural
as well as necessary for lawyers to emphasize or point up the
importance of human rights, especially as they affect minority
groups.
This need has been served to some extent by the Negro law
schools, but there is still a areat gap to fill. Fourteen of
the eighteen Negro attorneys practicing in the State of South
Carolina are graduates of the School of Law, South Carolina
State College, and three other graduates are practicing in
Southern states.3 8 Thirty-four of the graduates from North
Carolina College Law School are practicing in Southern
states.3 9 It is reasonable to assume that the majority of the
graduates of the other schools passing the bar in Southern
states are also practicing there.
To further emphasize the need for Negro lawyers in the
South, there are approximately seventy-five in the State of
North Carolina;4 0  eighteen in South Carolina; 4 1 forty-one in
Florida; 4 2 and four in Mississippi.4 3  About the time most of
these schools were established, the ratio of Negro lawyers in
the United States to Negro population was 1:24,997 as opposed
the ratio of white lawyers to white population of 1:702.44
In addition to providing legal training to prospective
lawyers and others, the law school renders a service to the
practicing Negro bar by giving counsel on important issues of
the day in the form of institutes and private consultations.
The school may also provide for assistance in research and
brief writing by qualified students under the supervision of a
law teacher. The law school also serves social agencies and
indigent persons from time to time in the form of legal aid.
And last but not least, the law school is an integral part of
the university or college and provides library services for
students in other disciplines in need of information peculiar
to the law library, and may be constant adviser to the admini-
stration in legal matters.
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CONCLUSION
Considering the contributions made by the Negro law
school in the field of legal education and community service,
particularly in the South, it is evident that they are serving
a need and useful purpose. During a period of social revolu-
tion as we are now experiencing, the Negro minority is in need
of more Negro lawyers to help chart the course to complete
freedom and equality under the law. His need cannot be ful-
filled as well without the Negro law schools as it can with
them even though attendance at other state law schools is no
longer based on race as a matter of law. This is true because
Negro students cannot now qualify in any appreciable number for
admission to the other state law schools because of their in-
ability to meet the educational and financial requirements.
The Negro is not entirely responsible for his plight.
For years in the South he has been subjected to an inferior
segregated education, and to job discrimination, which are
partly responsible for his inability to compete favorably with
whites for admission to law schools.
However, this does not mean that all students who fail to
make a specified score on the admission test cannot become
good lawyers. Many students of the small Negro law schools
who could not have made, or did not make, a high score on the
Law School Admission Test performed satisfactorily in law
school and turned out to be good lawyers.
There are some who take the position that since Negroes
now have the legal right to attend the white state-supported
law schools, the law schools originally established for the
exclusive training of Negroes should be closed. The reasons
given in support of this position are that it would save the
state some money and would achieve complete integration in the
law schools. These may be worthy causes, but the results
would be unjust at this time, in my opinion. This course of
action would lead to de facto segregation, or token integra-
tion at best, for at least a student generation. Since the
pattern of Negro education in the South has been segregated
and inferior, it would take that long for Negro students,
studying in an equal educational system, when that is
achieved, to be able to qualify in large numbers for admit-
tance to the white law schools. The state would lose the use
of needed facilities if the predicted increase in student
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population takes place in the near future. Unless the facili-
ties of the Negro law schools were integrated with the facili-
ties of the white law schools, which is not likely at this
time, the services of experienced law teachers would be lost.
In my opinion, there are other more practical courses of
action in reference to the future of segregated Negro law
schools supported by the state. The following are some sug-
gested possibilities:
I. Maintain them on an integrated basis for an interim
period baoed on a student generation of equality in
public education for all, and then transfer faculty
and students to the other state-supported law school.
2. Maintain them on an integrated basis for the interim
period with a steady increase in admission require-
ments, and then consolidate them with the other
state-supported law school utilizing present
facilities and faculty.
3. Integrate the present colleges or universities
supported by the state exclusively for Negroes
along with the law schools and maintain the law
schools as a part of the college or university
as they are now, and increase the admission re-
quirements over the interim period until they reach
a point where success in law school could be ex-
pected from all students admitted.
The third possibility seems to me to be the most attrac-
tive one. In my opinion, a law school on the campus of a
college or university adds more dignity to that college or
university and serves the administration and student body as a
whole in many tangible ways.
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